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I. INTRODUCTION
Far-reaching are the effects of the events of January 3, 1999, when Andrew 
Goldstein, a young man diagnosed with a severe mental illness, pushed Kendra 
Webdale on to the subway tracks where she was tragically killed by an oncoming 
train.1  Obscured by the saturation of media coverage that followed this painful inci-
dent2 was the fact that Goldstein had previously been rebuffed by the mental health 
system in his efforts to obtain treatment.3  From this tragic event came New York’s 
adoption of Kendra’s Law,4 a comprehensive statute establishing procedures for 
obtaining court orders mandating outpatient mental health treatment for those found 
by clear and convincing evidence to meet its criteria.
Much has been written about involuntary outpatient commitment (“OPC”).  It is 
not the purpose of this essay to fully explore OPC in general or New York’s version 
of such a law in particular, nor will I attempt to cover in depth the complex state of 
research related to OPC’s effectiveness.  I will, instead, put forth some thoughts to 
1. See Julian E. Barnes, Insanity Defense Fails for Man Who Threw Woman onto Track, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 
2000, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05EFD6173DF930A15750C0A
9669C8B63.
2. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment: Kendra’s Law as Case 
Study, 9 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 183, 184 (2003) [hereinafter Case Study].  Professor Perlin noted:
  [B]ecause of the sensational series of events that led to the introduction and passage of the 
law—the vivid and horrifying facts of Kendra Webdale’s death, the tortured life of her 
killer Andrew Goldstein, the saturation publicity given to the case and the way it became 
the focal point for so much political maneuvering in Albany—it has developed a public 
“following” that none of its predecessors shared.
 Id. 
3. See Margo Flug, No Commitment: Kendra’s Law Makes No Promise of Adequate Mental Health Treatment, 
10 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 105, 105 (2003); Peter A Briss et al., Strengthening Legal and Scientific 
Framework: Science and Public Health Policy Makers, 33 J. L. Med. & Ethics 89, 92 (2005) (statement of 
Richard N. Gottfried, Assemblyman, N.Y. State Assembly) (“Labels put on proposals, such as the 
names of victims put on laws . . . tend to obscure the real issues or crimes. . . .  [I]n New York State, we 
have Kendra’s Law named after a women who was pushed onto the train tracks in New York City by a 
person with a history of mental illness.  The aftermath of this included the passing of a law mandating 
court ordered assisted outpatient treatment.  The truth is that the man in Kendra’s case had not refused 
treatment; he had actually been banging on the doors of the system seeking help and getting turned 
away.  The facts in Kendra’s case had nothing to do with Kendra’s Law but once her name was affixed 
to it, it drove the bill to enactment.”).  This is not to say that people with mental disabilities do not at 
times refuse offers of assistance, even in cases where it seems clear to the outside observer that such 
refusal is not in the person’s best interest.  This is typically ascribed to a lack of insight on the part of the 
patient.  But, Tanya Marie Luhrmann found that:
  [H]omeless women who could get housing based on a psychiatric diagnosis but who reject 
it with the assertion that they are not “crazy” are making . . . a costly signal.  The signal is 
indeed expensive to them. The choice to forgo housing exposes them to considerable 
danger and discomfort.  But it is a signal that asserts competence and strength in a social 
setting in which those attributes are highly valued.
 Tanya Marie Luhrmann, “The Streets Will Drive You Crazy”: Why Homeless Psychotic Women in the 
Institutional Circuit in the United States Often Say No to Offers of Help, 165 Am. J. Psychiatry 15, 15 
(2008).  I wonder if the primary insight here is that people, including those diagnosed with mental 
disabilities, are, to a sometimes surprising degree, willing to go to great lengths to maintain a sense of 
dignity and autonomy.
4. Diane D. Denish, City’s Kendra’s Law an Empty Promise, Albuquerque J., Apr. 21, 2006, at A13.  
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prompt further inquiry and, I hope, provoke some thinking about an issue that has 
engendered more vitriol than rational discourse.  As I delineate some thoughts on 
this topic, I will note a series of what I refer to as dialogue points, the good-faith 
discussion of which I suggest would help law-makers, advocates, and clinicians reach 
a socially constructive and ethically sound solution to the “incredible dilemmas”5 that 
OPC brings into stark relief whenever and wherever it is proposed.6  The primary 
goal is to add, in some modest fashion, to the “national dialogue [which] is taking 
place on the legality and morality of allowing deprivations, such as jail or 
hospitalization to be avoided, and rewards, such as money or housing to be obtained, 
based on adherence to treatment.”7  In this context, OPC is but one manifestation of 
5. As discussed by the Supreme Court in a different context, “[t]he law should not, and in our judgment 
does not, place the defendant in such an incredible dilemma.”  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193 
(1957).  The dilemma in Green was that, in the words of the court, “[the defendant] must be willing to 
barter his constitutional protection against a second prosecution for an offense punishable by death as 
the price of a successful appeal from an erroneous conviction of another offense for which he has been 
sentenced to five to twenty years’ imprisonment.”  Although Green presented this concept in a distinct 
context, the notion that some situations present seemingly impossible to reconcile interests is apropos to 
this discussion.  As in other areas of current national significance, I would argue that it is not constructive 
to prematurely frame the debate as one of safety vs. civil liberties, a truly incredible dilemma if ever 
there was one—at least when not fairly presented.  See Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the 
Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 517, 540 n.142 
(citing Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional Right on the Forfeiture of 
Another, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 741, 742 (1981)). 
6. As I will discuss what I consider to be some underlying assumptions held by some of the participants in 
the controversy concerning OPC, it seems only fair that I state some of my core beliefs about this 
important area.  On a meta-level, I am deeply concerned about a growing trend away from a respect for 
the inherent right of self-determination possessed by all human beings—a principle which I believe is at 
the core of American values.  I personally believe we are all, collectively and individually, in trouble if 
this does not remain a bedrock, commonly-shared value in our society.  See generally Dora W. Klein, 
Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill: Autonomy Is Asking the Wrong Question, 27 Vt. L. Rev. 649 
(2003), for an interesting discussion of this question.  If improperly implemented, OPC could certainly 
be one part of this troubling trajectory.  At the same time, I have seen in individual instances beneficial 
results from its application—people who stabilize and lead more productive lives as a result of this 
intervention.  There are times when I wonder if these two observations can be reconciled.  There are 
times when deeply f lawed solutions to large-scale social, ethical, and public health problems can still be 
the humane and safest thing to do in specific, individual cases.  The problem, I think, comes from the 
fact that this is only true if we acquiesce to our avoidance of systemic solutions to these problems.  More 
specifically, given our inability as a society to truly deal with the need for universal access to quality 
healthcare, the dwindling public health care system and the over-representation of disenfranchised 
groups among those who rely on this scarce resource, and the large-scale incarceration of the mentally 
ill in our criminal justice system, perhaps OPC is, in any particular instance, the most practicable tool 
available to those on the ground at any given point in time.  That does not mean that taken from the 
public health or public policy perspectives this is the best we as a society can do.  Nor, therefore, should 
enactment of an OPC statute end the discussion in any particular jurisdiction.  As Justice Brandeis said, 
“Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes 
are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.”  Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). 
7. John Monahan, Mandated Treatment: Applying Leverage to Achieve Adherence, 36 J. Am. Psychiatry L. 
282, 284 (2008).
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the coercion applied to people with mental disabilities living in the community, 
aimed at increasing adherence to prescribed treatment regiments.
II.  BACKGROUND: INVOLUNTARY OUTPATIENT COMMITMENT
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, or OPC, is also known in some jurisdic-
tions as “assisted outpatient treatment,”8 and in some commonwealth jurisdictions as 
“community treatment orders.”9  Psychiatrist Marvin Swartz and psychologist Jeffrey 
Swanson suggest that: “[OPC] is a legal intervention designed to benefit persons 
with serious mental illness . . . who need ongoing psychiatric care and support to 
prevent relapse, hospital readmissions, homelessness, or incarceration, but have dif-
ficulty following through with community-based treatment.”10  In all forms of OPC, 
a judge orders a person who resides in the community and meets certain statutorily 
defined criteria, to follow a prescribed course of treatment related to a diagnosed 
mental health condition.11 
We do not venture far into what would appear to be a fairly straightforward 
definitional matter before we are confronted with core assumptions underlying much 
of the debate about OPC.  Swartz’s and Swanson’s definition seemingly works off of 
the assumptions that the target population is ill, that the population is in need of 
treatment that its members are incapable of seeking on their own, and that the pro-
posed services will ameliorate a wide range of medical and social ills.  
Consider, however, the following definition: OPC is a legal intervention designed 
to disproportionately coerce into treatment members of racial minority groups who 
are labeled as having psychiatric disorders or are victims of a variety of social condi-
tions, notwithstanding the fact that they wish to resist this unwanted treatment 
which generally includes forced drugging.12  This definition emphasizes the coercive 
and unwanted nature of the so-called treatment.  Additionally, there is the clear 
implication that OPC is primarily an agent of social control, targeting segments of 
society already subjected to destructive, disparate treatment. 
What if, however, the following definition were tendered: OPC is a legally sanc-
tioned method of ensuring that people meeting statutorily defined criteria are given 
priority in securing scarce mental health treatment and social service resources. 
Furthermore, OPC is designed to ensure that the treatment system provides the 
identified and needed services.  This definition emphasizes yet another aspect of 
OPC—the statutory schema is designed to move to the front of the line those who 
8. See, e.g., Laura’s Law, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5345 (West 2008).
9. See, e.g., Mental Health Act, R.S.O., ch. M7, s. 33.1 (West 2008).
10. Marvin S. Swartz & Jeffrey W. Swanson, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment, Community Treatment 
Orders, and Assisted Outpatient Treatment: What’s in the Data?, 49 Can. J. Psychiatry 585, 585 (2004).
11. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60 (McKinney 1999).
12. See generally N.Y. Lawyers for Pub. Interest, Implementation of “Kendra’s Law” Is Severely 
Biased, (Apr. 7, 2005), [hereinafter Implementation of “Kendra’s Law”] available at http://nylpi.
org/pub/Kendras_Law_04-07-05.pdf. 
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are the subject of court-ordered outpatient treatment,13 holding the system as well as 
the subjects accountable for treatment.14 
Scholars Jennifer Honig and Susan Stefan offer a credibly neutral definition:
OPC . . . is a court order compelling the compliance of an individual living 
outside of an institution with a treatment regimen or other aspects of 
community life.  The order generally mandates acceptance of psychiatric 
medication and may mandate receipt of other services, such as individual or 
group therapy, participation in educational or vocation programs, and 
supervised living arrangements.15
With this general background in mind, we turn to several dialogue points.
III. DISCUSSION
Dialogue Point 1: Multiple assumptions and values fuel OPC definitions.
Any comprehensive approach to the issue of OPC must be cognizant and respect-
ful of the range of assumptions and values concerning OPC, and must recognize that 
certain aspects of OPC will be afforded different weights depending upon the out-
look of the person creating the definition.  A careful analysis of the underlying 
assumptions of each stakeholder to the OPC dialogue helps us to examine how the 
interests related to those assumptions are vindicated (or not vindicated) in any pro-
posed or existing OPC legislation. 
The prototypical OPC law was developed in North Carolina in 1985.16  At pres-
ent, most states have statutes providing for some type of OPC.17  Some states, 
however, make more active use of OPC than others.18  In recent years, a trend toward 
enactment of OPC statutes has gained international momentum—reaching Israel, 
13. While surely made by others, I first made this point in a presentation on OPC at the Twenty-fifth 
International Congress on Law and Mental Health in Siena, Italy: if nothing else, OPC is at heart a 
rationing statute.  In many ways, this point is made by the question posed by the very title of the paper 
referenced infra note 14, Outpatient Commitment in Mental Health: Is Coercion the Price of Community 
Services?.
14. See, e.g., Outpatient Commitment in Mental Health: Is Coercion the Price of Community Services?, 757 Issue 
Brief (Nat’l. Health Policy Forum of George Washington Univ., Washington, D.C.), July 11, 2000, at 
5 (quoting an anonymous policy advisor: “A lot of providers don’t want to treat the people who are at 
higher risk for relapsing [those that would be subject to outpatient treatment orders] because they are 
the most difficult to treat . . . .  We now have the ability to encourage accountability among 
providers.”).
15. Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, New Research Continues to Challenge the Need for Outpatient Commitment, 
31 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 109, 110 (2005).
16. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-2 (2008). 
17. See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-2 (2008); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-540 (2008).
18. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessing Kendra’s Law: Five Years of Outpatient Commitment in New York, 
56 Psychiatric Services 791, 791 (2005) (“Forty-two states now have some form of statutory 
authorization for involuntary outpatient treatment, although surveys suggest that only a minority 
actively implement such laws.”). 
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Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.19  In a mutually rein-
forcing phenomenon, this has added to the sense of inevitability of these statutes in 
the United States. 
New York enacted Kendra’s Law20 in 1999 and was among the last states to 
adopt an explicit OPC statute.  Nonetheless, my experience, both nationally and 
internationally, has been that many knowledgeable people discuss the issue of OPC 
as if it began with New York’s adoption of Kendra’s Law.21  One need look no further 
than the recent attempt to adopt OPC in New Mexico for a striking example of this 
phenomenon: the defeated proposal for an OPC law was actually entitled Kendra’s 
Law.22  Thus, as a practical matter, much of the deliberation concerning the efficacy 
of OPC and the wisdom of enacting OPC statutes in other jurisdictions centers on 
an analysis of Kendra’s Law.23  
19. See, e.g., Swartz & Swanson, supra note 10, at 585.  Recently, scholars from Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States were brought to the same podium to partake in a 
panel entitled The Role of Political Perceptions in the Development of Mental Health Legislation at the 30th 
International Congress on Law and Mental Health in Padua, Italy.  The panel focused on involuntary 
outpatient commitment.  My role was to discuss the New York experience.
20. N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 9.60 (McKinney 1999).
21. See, e.g., Joel A. Dvoskin & Erin M. Spiers, Commentary: In Search of Common Ground, 31 J. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry L. 184, 185 (2003) (discussing the universal debate regarding problems associated with 
OPC, the article uses Kendra’s Law as an identifying tool for the general pitfalls of OPC legislation).
22. See, e.g., Denish, supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., Perlin, Case Study, supra note 2, at 184.  Professor Perlin wrote:
  Kendra’s Law is one of those state-specific statutes whose impact will inevitably extend 
beyond the one jurisdiction in which it is law.  New York is far from the first state to 
experiment with an [OPC] law (although that is something that the unsuspecting reader 
would not know from the press coverage).
 Id.  Under the New York Mental Hygiene laws, a court may order a person to OPC if the court finds 
that the patient meets the following criteria: is at least eighteen years of age; suffers from a mental ill-
ness and is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision, as deemed by a clinical 
determination; has a history of noncompliance with treatments that has resulted in one or more seri-
ously violent acts, threats of violence, or attempted violence toward self or others within the last 
forty-eight months, or which has resulted in a hospitalization or receipt of mental health services at a 
correctional facility at least twice within the last thirty-six months—excluding the period of hospital-
ization or incarceration immediately prior to the filing of the petition; is unlikely to voluntarily 
participate in treatment; and will likely benefit from treatment and needs such treatment in order to 
prevent behavior likely to result in serious harm to the patient or others.  N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law 
§ 9.60(c) (McKinney 1999).  Court proceedings are initiated by petitions.  Potential petitioners include 
parents, spouses, persons with whom the subject resides, children, siblings, a qualified treating psychia-
trist, or a probation or parole officer charged with supervising the individual.  N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law. 
§ 9.60(e)(1)(i–vii).  The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit of a physician (not the petitioner) 
who attests either that he or she has examined the patient within ten days and recommends OPC, or 
that the physician has been unable to examine the patient because of non-cooperation by the patient and 
that “such physician has reason to suspect that the subject of the petition meets the criteria for assisted 
outpatient treatment.”  N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60(e)(3)(ii).
85
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 53 | 2008/09
Dialogue Point 2: The mass media has reduced the ability for rational discourse about   
OPC.
Media portrayals of the mentally ill, as well as the tragic nature of specific cases 
where a person with a mental disability kills or harms another person, color our 
thinking, making difficult a dispassionate discussion of the facts of specific cases and 
reducing the likelihood of a response that is rationally related to the provoking inci-
dent.24  One question which should inform an analysis of any such situation is: to 
what extent does a vivid, horrible event create pressure for a solution to a perceived 
problem that incorrectly equates mental illness with dangerousness, and/or creates a 
solution not reflective of the underlying problem?
After Kendra Webdale’s death, calls came from many corners for legislation 
aimed at dealing with mentally ill people who resist treatment in the community, 
and thus endanger society.25  Much of the coverage was seemingly unaware of the 
fact that Goldstein had previously sought treatment voluntarily.26  This is not par-
ticularly surprising when one examines the portrayal of people with mental illness in 
the media and popular culture, where they are typically portrayed in unfavorable 
ways.  A comprehensive summary of these media portrayals by Professors Patricia 
Stout, Jorge Villegas, and Nancy Jennings found that: 
[s]pecifically, the media tended to present severe, psychotic disorders.  Persons 
with mental illness were depicted as being inadequate, unlikable, and 
dangerous and as lacking social identity.  Characters with mental illness were 
portrayed as unemployable—they were less likely to be employed outside the 
home and more likely to be seen as failures when employed.  Even more 
consistent were depictions of violence and dangerousness associated with 
media images of mental illness.  Signorielli found that 72 percent of characters 
with mental illness portrayed in prime-time television dramas were violent.27
Professor Elaine Sieff reviewed the specific case of the portrayal of Andrew 
Goldstein in this light and found that he was referred to, for example, as a “ticking 
time bomb.”28  In this way, in the New York public’s mind the Webdale case was 
connected with its modern antecedent—the case of Larry Hogue.29  Mr. Hogue, 
24. See Elaine Sieff, Media Frames of Mental Illness: The Potential Impact of Negative Frames, 12 J. Mental 
Health 259 (2003) (describing how the mentally disabled are portrayed in the media and the power of 
that portrayal in shaping public opinion regarding this group of citizens).
25. See Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 791 (“[T]he attack [on Kendra Webdale] galvanized the public and 
lawmakers in support of the proposed legislation.”).
26. Michael Cooper, Suspect Has a History of Mental Illness, but Not of Violence, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1999, at 
B6.  
27. Patricia Stout et al., Images of Mental Illness in the Media: Identifying Gaps in the Research, 30 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 543, 545–51 (2004) (citations omitted).
28. Sieff, supra note 24, at 264. 
29. Seltzer v. Hogue, 594 N.Y.S.2d 781 (2d Dep’t 1993).
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labeled in the media as the “wild man of 96th street,”30 was described by a resident of 
the Manhattan area where he spent much of his time while living in the community 
in the following way:
Hogue appeared to be merely a harmless homeless man to whom she [Lehr] 
used to bring food and clothing.  However, over the years Hogue’s behavior 
turned violent and erratic.  Specifically, Lehr observed Hogue on numerous 
occasions jumping into moving traffic from crouched positions between cars.  
She also observed Hogue siphoning gasoline out of parked cars at 2:00 or 
3:00 A.M., igniting newspapers with the gasoline, and then stuffing the 
newspapers into other cars, and assaulting and injuring an old woman.  Lehr 
further testified that on one occasion Hogue carried a marble bench weighing 
approximately 150 pounds from a building adjacent to her own, and crashed 
it with “great fury” through the window of her car, bending the frame and 
breaking the steering wheel.  Hogue also frequently exposed himself in the 
middle of the street and masturbated.  Finally, Lehr testified that at another, 
earlier hearing involving Hogue, he had threatened her by saying: “You’re 
dead, bitch.”31
Because his criminal oﬀ enses were minor and his mental status would typically clear 
rapidly following a brief period oﬀ  of drugs, he was not retained in either the criminal 
justice or mental health systems for any signiﬁ cant period of time.  Th is case height-
ened the sense that these systems overemphasized individual rights to the detriment 
of community safety.
The connection between mental illness and dangerousness is the subject of much 
popular and scholarly exploration, and is beyond the scope of this essay.32  But no 
discussion of OPC can be complete without acknowledging that an important per-
30. See, e.g., Editorial, The “Wild Man” and the Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1992, at 18, available at http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE1D8113FF93AA1575BC0A964958260.
31. Seltzer, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
32. For a good starting point in understanding this topic, see generally the United States Department of 
Health and Human Service Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Understanding 
Mental Illness: Factsheet, http://www.samhsa.gov/MentalHealth/understanding_Mentalllness_
Factsheet.aspx.  
  Research has shown that the vast majority of people who are violent do not suffer from 
mental illnesses.  Clearly, mental health status makes at best a trivial contribution to the 
overall level of violence in society.  [T]he absolute risk of violence among the mentally ill as 
a group is still very small and . . . only a small proportion of the violence in our society can 
be attributed to persons who are mentally ill.  Most people who suffer from a mental 
disorder are not violent—there is no need to fear them.  Embrace them for who they are—
normal human beings experiencing a difficult time, who need your open mind, caring 
attitude, and helpful support.  Compared with the risk associated with the combination of 
male gender, young age, and lower socioeconomic status, the risk of violence presented by 
mental disorder is modest.  People with psychiatric disabilities are far more likely to be 
victims than perpetrators of violent crime.  A new study by researchers at North Carolina 
State University and Duke University has found that people with severe mental illness—
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder or psychosis—are 2 1 ⁄2 times more likely to be attacked, 
raped or mugged than the general population.
 Id. (formatting and citations omitted).
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ception concerning OPC is that it protects the public.33  Indeed, one might ask if 
outpatient commitment statutes are enacted primarily as a transitional step toward a 
person’s independent and fully integrated community functioning, or if their bedrock 
purpose is to enhance monitoring and treatment of such individuals to promote pub-
lic safety.  Are these goals mutually exclusive?  I would assert that they are not.  In 
fact, I would argue that people with mental illness who are offered treatment and 
services which address their needs in a manner that engages their desires for dignity 
and independence (the goal of which is to assist them in maintaining the greatest 
degree of autonomy and community integration reasonably possible) will be more 
likely to accept such offers of assistance, and as a result may pose a reduced public 
safety risk.
Dialogue Point 3: Where you stand on OPC depends upon where you sit.
Early reference to OPC schema can be found in the landmark patient-rights case 
of Lessard v. Schmidt, which mentioned OPC as an alternative to the more restrictive 
involuntary hospitalization.34  Initial OPC efforts can be seen as attempts to reduce 
the degree of coercion employed on people already subjected to some degree of invol-
untary psychiatric oversight, making these efforts consistent with the least restrictive 
alternative principle.35  In contrast, later iterations of OPC are seen by some as efforts 
33. If we required any reminder of this, we need look no further than the recent events at Virginia Tech, 
when, on April 16, 2007, a student with a previously identified mental illness opened fire at the school, 
killing thirty-two people before committing suicide.  The horrific event reinvigorated the discussion 
concerning privacy laws, but also brought additional attention to the question of whether OPC can 
assist in preventing such tragedies.  See, e.g., Aaron Levin, Va. Tech Tragedy Spurs Examination of 
Commitment, Campus MH, Psychiatric News, June 1, 2007, at 1, available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.
org/cgi/content/full/42/11/1-a?etoc.  Even since that unsettling event last year, there have been at least 
two, recent, high-profile crimes allegedly committed by people with mental disabilities.  It will be 
instructive to follow media portrayals of these horrific events and compare and contrast them to the 
manner in which the media dealt with Andrew Goldstein’s murder of Kendra Webdale some nine years 
ago.  See Monica Davey, Gunman Showed Few Hints of Trouble, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 2008, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/16/us/16gunman.html?scp=3&sq=mental+gun&st=nyt 
(reporting the instance of a twenty-seven-year-old man who had apparently stopped taking his 
psychiatric medications prior to opening  fire and killing five students and himself on an Illinois 
campus); Daryl Khan & Fernanda Santos, Bizarre Turn at Hearing for Suspect in Stabbing, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 17, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/nyregion/17cnd-murder.html?e
x=1203915600&en=17a02b3e3c1d4307&ei=5070&emc=eta1 (describing a case involving a 
thirty-year-old man with an apparent psychiatric history accused of stabbing to death a Manhattan 
psychologist and injuring another psychologist who had been involved in his prior civil commitment 
proceedings).
34. 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“These alternatives [to inpatient 
commitment] include voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in a hospital, 
night treatment in a hospital, placement in the custody of a friend or relative, placement in a nursing 
home, referral to a community mental health clinic, and home health aide services.”).
35. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
  [W]e confront the question whether the proscription of discrimination may require 
placement of persons with mental disabilities in community settings rather than in 
institutions.  The answer, we hold, is a qualified yes.  Such action is in order when the 
State’s treatment professionals have determined that community placement is appropriate, 
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to widen the net, placing a larger group of people within the coerced treatment sys-
tem.36 
 Dialogue Point 3a: Examining OPC as an alternative to inpatient commitment   
 focuses on fundamentally different aspects of its effects than does an analysis   
 viewing OPC as an autonomy reducing statute.
OPC looks quite different if viewed as an autonomy-enhancing, 
community-based alternative to inpatient commitment, than if viewed from the 
point of view of the person already living in the community who wishes to retain the 
right to make fundamental choices concerning medical treatment.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to ask: what is the goal of any proposed OPC statute, and what is the 
target population—people living inside of institutions or those living in the commu-
nity?  Another fair question is: who is viewed as the primary beneficiary of the OPC 
order—the individual or society?
The degree to which OPC is seen as an intrusion on civil liberties depends not 
only on whether it is contrasted to being confined to a hospital or to living freely in 
the community, but also on how one perceives the restrictions of the court order 
itself.  Like most OPC statutes, New York’s law does not have contempt provisions, 
so while a person is ordered to follow a certain course of treatment, there are few 
consequences attached to noncompliance.  In New York, a subject who violates an 
OPC order (or, as it would be called in New York, an AOT order) can be brought to 
an emergency room for a period of observation not to exceed seventy-two hours, 
after which time a person not found to meet ordinary civil commitment criteria must 
be released.37
This situation may have narrative and factual truths (the subjective experience of 
someone that cannot be quantified versus objective facts) that are difficult to recon-
cile.  A person may feel the coercion associated with a judicial decree that he or she 
must comply with a prescribed course of treatment.  Further, while OPC is certainly 
less intrusive than involuntary inpatient commitment, being forcibly brought to an 
emergency room and held in the hospital for seventy-two hours without the option of 
leaving is still a considerable intrusion on liberty.
the transfer from institutional care to a less restrictive setting is not opposed by the affected 
individual, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the 
resources available to the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.
 Id.
36. But see Perlin, Case Study, supra note 2, at 187–88; Jeffrey L. Geller et al.,  Involuntary Outpatient 
Treatment as “Deinstitutionalized Coercion”: The Net-Widening Concerns, 29 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 551 
(2006) (reporting the findings of a naturalistic experiment in Massachusetts which revealed that net-
widening did not occur, despite an environment strongly conducive to that expansion).
37. See, e.g., Ilissa L. Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s Law: New York’s Solution for 
Treatment of the Chronically Mental Ill, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1181, 1200 (2001) (“[M]edication may not be 
administered over the individual’s objection.  In cases of noncompliance, a physician may recommend 
that the patient be taken to a hospital and be retained there for up to seventy-two hours to determine if 
a need exists for inpatient treatment.”) (citation omitted). 
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 Dialogue Point 3b: Depending upon one’s viewpoint, OPC’s impact reflects   
 either its lack of consequences for noncompliance or its coercive nature.
OPC statutes can be seen as having “no teeth” or as being unnervingly intrusive. 
The lack of contempt provisions in such laws does not negate what may be a narra-
tive truth reflecting a considerable sense of coercion and loss of personal dignity.  
 Dialogue Point 3c: Judges, like the rest of us, may be influenced by paternalism   
 and a desire to see good outcomes.  
Judicial paternalism manifests itself either in the sense of wishing to see an indi-
vidual do well, or as conservatism in judicial decision-making based upon a desire to 
avoid spectacular failures.38  The same it-depends-upon-your-perspective phenome-
non concerning the statute itself is relevant to judicial decision-making regarding 
renewals of existing OPC orders.  I have personally witnessed many such hearings 
where the testimonies of both the physician and OPC subject are factually consis-
tent.39  For example, the patient is taking medications, attending group therapy, and 
has remained out of the hospital during the pendency of the OPC order.  Yet each 
draws opposite conclusions from this set of essentially stipulated facts.
The physician sees OPC as an effective intervention as demonstrated by improved 
functioning of the patient.  Why, the doctors posit, would the patient not continue 
such a beneficial treatment regime?  In contrast, the subject of the OPC order may, 
in these same factual circumstances, see a disparate, yet equally obvious conclusion: 
he is doing better and no longer requires an intrusive interference with his autonomy. 
How a judge reconciles these opposing presentations will often depend upon the 
degree of paternalism he or she is comfortable with.  From my experience, the pull 
toward the “better safe than sorry” approach often proves irresistible, leading judges 
to renew orders in circumstances such as the one described above.  Again, where you 
stand depends upon where you sit.  This is no less true for a person sitting upon the 
bench as it is for the rest of us. 
These divergent perspectives on OPC engender difficult and often contradictory 
pulls in many of those who examine it.40  This makes OPC stand out from other 
forms of coercion used to promote adherence to socially-desirable behaviors among 
people with mental disabilities.  As Professor John Monahan and his colleagues 
38. In my experience, judges may err on the side of caution to avoid being responsible for releasing someone 
who then causes harm. 
39. I have represented various New York City area hospitals in a variety of mental hygiene hearings over the 
past decade.
40. See Flug, supra note 3, at 108–09.
  [T]he central characteristic of Kendra’s Law, and possibly the biggest reason for its 
popularity, is that it is based on the belief that coercion is necessary to successfully treat 
severe mental illnesses in an outpatient setting.  The Law’s strongest critics counter, 
however, that most people with severe mental illnesses would accept treatment voluntarily 
if the State offered more comprehensive and more f lexible services.
 Id.
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pointed out in 2001, leverage is employed in many situations affecting this group, 
including the withholding or providing of welfare benefits, representative payees, 
subsidized housing, and, increasingly for those arrested, sentencing considerations in 
exchange for compliance with OPC treatment requirements.41 
Dialogue Point 4: OPC statutes cause visceral, polarizing reactions among many 
stakeholders on all sides of the issue.
In that same article, Monahan makes a point which, sadly, cannot be taken for 
granted: “an evidence-based approach must rapidly come to replace the ideologic 
posturing that currently characterizes the field [referring to OPC].”42  This informal 
essay does not attempt to comprehensively review the evidence which is available in 
the field.  Rather, I submit that there exist some empirical questions which must first 
be asked, and then answered objectively if we are to move beyond the “ideologic pos-
turing” Monahan so aptly describes.43
In 2004, Swartz and Swanson conducted a comprehensive literature review ask-
ing the question: what’s in the data concerning OPC?44  They conclude that OPC 
appears to be most effective when sustained for six months or more, and is most 
effective for people with psychotic disorders.45  The study further notes that “OPC is 
not a substitute for comprehensive services; in fact, it is only effective if combined 
with frequent services.”46  It is the latter of these findings that has the greatest impli-
cations for this discussion because, I think, it shows the way for both advocacy and 
science in this area.  OPC is only helpful with sustained treatment.  Advocacy should 
be aimed toward obtaining better treatment for the mentally disabled client.
Dialogue Point 5: Advocates in OPC proceedings significantly influence the outcomes.
Early advocacy concerning OPC, particularly in New York, focused on constitu-
tional attacks.  In 1986, the New York Court of Appeals decided the ground-breaking 
case of Rivers v. Katz, holding, on strictly state constitutional grounds, that an invol-
untarily committed patient in a psychiatric hospital could not be medicated over his 
or her objection absent an emergency, unless the hospital proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person: (1) suffered from a mental illness; (2) lacked the 
capacity to make a reasoned decision; and, those threshold findings being made; (3) 
that the proposed treatment was the least restrictive way of treating the illness; and 
(4) was in the patient’s best interest.47 
41. See, e.g., John Monahan et al., Mandated Community Treatment: Beyond Outpatient Commitment, 52 
Psychiatric Services 1198 (2001).
42. Id. at 1204.
43. Id.
44. Swartz & Swanson, supra note 10.
45. Id. at 585.
46. Id.
47. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 497–98 (1986). 
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When confronted with Kendra’s Law petitions, attorneys representing the men-
tally ill focused on the threshold requirement in Rivers—that the person subjected to 
involuntary medication had to lack the capacity to make a reasoned decision—prior 
to moving on with the inquiry as to whether medication over objection could be 
judicially sanctioned.48  Surely, they reasoned, if such a requirement attached to 
forced drugging within a hospital (presumably focusing on a more incapacitated 
cohort), then the New York State constitution would require the same finding prior 
to mandated medication in outpatient treatment.  How, it was asked, could it be that 
a person confined to a hospital could be afforded a greater bundle of rights than a 
person living within the community?
Such were the constitutional questions presented to the New York Court of 
Appeals in In re K.L.,49 a case involving a man with a diagnosis of schizoaffective 
disorder who did not comply regularly with his medications and, at times, became 
aggressive.  He challenged Kendra’s Law on equal protection grounds because it 
failed to require the threshold finding that he lacked the capacity to make his own 
treatment decisions.50  The New York Court of Appeals, however, did not agree that 
such a threshold finding was required for OPC orders.  The court held that Kendra’s 
Law did not
violate equal protection by failing to require a finding of incapacity before a 
patient can be subjected to an [OPC] order.  Although persons subject to 
guardianship proceedings and involuntarily committed psychiatric patients 
must be found incapacitated before they can be forcibly medicated against 
their will, a court-ordered assisted outpatient treatment plan simply does not 
authorize forcible medical treatment—nor, of course, could it, absent incapac-
ity.  The statute thus in no way treats similarly situated persons differently.51
No forced medication could occur under Kendra’s Law; thus no prior ﬁ nding of lack 
of capacity was constitutionally required.52
As a matter of law, it seems settled that Kendra’s Law and other similar schema 
will pass constitutional muster.53  Where does that leave an advocate?  One obvious 
answer is that an individual subject to an OPC order must still meet the statutory 
criteria.  As a result, there are always fact-specific arguments in any given case for 
48. See, e.g., In re K.L., 1 N.Y.3d 362, 369 (2004).
49. See id.
50. Id. at 482–83.
51. Id. at 486.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Moore v. Wyo. Med. Ctr., 825 F. Supp. 1531, 1536–39 (D. Wyo. 1993) (noting that a state 
statute allowing an officer or medical examiner to detain a mentally ill person with a threshold standard 
of “substantial probability” of causing themselves or others harm did not deprive the individual of their 
liberty interest and therefore the standard need not be the more vigorous “imminent threat of physical 
harm” to pass “constitutional muster”); Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976) 
(holding that a state’s interest in emergency intervention is sufficient to justify the temporary deprivation 
of a mentally ill patient’s liberty interest, and in such a case, no prior notice or hearing is necessary). 
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why a client is not a suitable candidate.  Non-constitutional arguments may be put 
forth to defeat OPC laws as well.  In addition, other courts in jurisdictions where 
OPC statutes have not yet been challenged might be more sympathetic to constitu-
tional arguments.  
I would suggest an additional possibility—that OPC statutes might be used by 
advocates as a vehicle to secure needed services for their clients.  Note that Kendra’s 
Law brought with it a considerable increase in funding for short-in-supply, yet needed 
services such as medications and case management services.54  
One early case, Arden Hill Hospital v. Daniel W., held that, except in instances 
where the respondent had sufficient resources, the county was the party responsible 
for financing court-ordered services.55  It is the treatment provider who brings the 
petition to which a specific treatment plan must be appended.56  But should not the 
advocate with a willing client, instead of the treatment provider, examine with great 
scrutiny the services offered in the plan?  Whether the services are suitable?  Whether 
they are sufficient?  Do they meet with the client’s approval?  Does an independent 
expert agree?  Why would an advocate not consider bringing a contempt motion 
against a provider that secured a court order mandating a certain type of treatment 
and then subsequently failed to provide it properly?  Is this not an appropriate form 
of advocacy in a post-In re K.L. world? 
Acceptance of this proposed approach in some (not all) circumstances leads to an 
important empirical question: what do the data tell us about what types of services57 
are useful to the group subjected to the restrictions associated with treatment pro-
vider prescribed treatment plans?  Perhaps one of reasons that the discussion of OPC 
has evolved as it has is the over-reliance on medication as the sole or primary form of 
assistance.58 
Indeed, attendant questions arise: Would subjects of OPC orders be more ame-
nable to the treatment plan provided if they had a more meaningful opportunity to 
participate in its creation?  Is this an appropriate consideration for counsel represent-
ing subjects of OPC orders?  In OPC, even more so than in other areas of mental 
disability law, outcomes and the very nature of the proceedings are intensely depen-
54. The statute introduced considerable funding for transitional medications and case management services. 
See Erin O’Connor, Note and Comment, Is Kendra’s Law a Keeper?  How Kendra’s Law Erodes 
Fundamental Rights of the Mentally Ill, 11 J.L. & Pol’y 313, 364 n.255 (“To implement the law, the state 
has allocated more funding for community programs and discharge planning.”). 
55. 703 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (Sup. Ct. Orange County 2000).
56. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 960 (McKinney 2008).
57. I use the word services knowingly as it is meant to encompass housing, financial support, integrated 
mental health, and substance abuse treatment when indicated, in addition to medication when 
warranted.
58. See Rachel A. Scherer, Note, Toward a Twenty-First Century Civil Commitment Statute:  A Legal, Medical, 
and Policy Analysis of Preventative Outpatient Treatment, 4 Ind. Health L. Rev 361, 369 (2007).
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dent upon the role of counsel.  To some extent, whether OPC petitions are contested 
“appears to be a function of venue.”59  
Should the proper role of the advocate in an OPC proceeding be to secure more 
or different services for the client?  If so, what services would be useful to, and 
accepted by, any given client, and how would greater consumer participation in the 
development of treatment plans improve adherence to treatment with or without a 
court order?60
Dialogue Point 6: OPC criteria mandate the inclusion of specifically defined people.
It is beyond question that, as a matter of public policy, OPC laws are, at heart, 
rationing statutes.  OPC statutes give certain groups of people priority in securing 
59. Perlin, Case Study, supra note 2, at n.156 (emphasis omitted).  In his analysis, Perlin notes that one unit 
of lawyers representing people in Kendra’s Law petitions (attorneys in the Second Department) contests 
these petitions disproportionately.  Perlin further notes that “sources in that office” informed him “that 
their primary concern is the way the law has been implemented: that it may potentially undermine the 
therapeutic alliance (by undermining individuals’ sense of self-esteem and self-importance).”  Id.  It is 
interesting to consider this point in conjunction with the insights provided by Luhrmann’s study, supra 
note 3, which notes that some people will reject assistance in order to project a sense of strength and 
competence, even when these actions appear to those of us outside of the milieu to be irrational. 
60. For an advocate to answer this requires the examination of some tricky questions.  One is foundational—
what is the role of an advocate in the representation of the mentally disabled?  But, given the number of 
jurisdictions nationally and internationally which have adopted OPC schema, a second could be 
characterized as strategic—has the battle engaged in by some to defeat the advance of OPC statutes 
been lost?  If so, should the focus shift toward ensuring adequate representation of subjects of OPC 
proceedings and toward using OPC orders as leverage to secure scarce services for clients?  Or, for 
example, does the recent rejection of an OPC statute in New Mexico, and the New York State 
legislature’s unwillingness to make Kendra’s Law permanent, suggest that the call for surrender is 
premature?  I have argued the former, but understand that others may see this differently.  Further, the 
ground may have shifted somewhat since I first proposed this idea.  On August 5, 2008, the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s decision to strike down New Mexico’s version of 
Kendra’s Law.  While the court based its opinion on a number of grounds related to a city’s lack of 
authority to preempt by ordinance a state code and statute, it also distinguished New York cases 
upholding that state’s OPC on due process grounds: 
  [E]ven, for the purpose of argument, were we to read the Ordinance to be consistent with 
the New York statute as to the absence of a sanction, for two reasons we conclude that the 
reasoning behind the New York court’s due process holding cannot be applied in the 
context of the preemption analysis at issue in this case.  First, the New York court was 
faced with a state statute that addressed assisted outpatient treatment, not an ordinance.  
Consequently, the due process discussion in In re K.L. is not particularly helpful to our 
consideration of the separate issue of preemption, especially because the New York 
legislature had incorporated other, related mental health statutes into its assisted outpatient 
treatment statute.  When considering preemption, we must, above all, follow our 
Legislature’s intent, which, as we discussed earlier in this opinion, is clearly that no person 
with capacity be treated without consent.  Second, unlike the New York statute, the 
Ordinance does not state that the failure to comply with a court order will not result in 
sanctions.
 Protection and Advocacy System, Jane Does 1–3 and John Doe 1 v. City of Albuquerque, No. 27-199, 
slip op. at 47 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008) (citations omitted), cert. denied, No. 31-301 (N.M. Sept. 22, 
2008).  
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scarce or at least finite mental health services.61  In New York’s case, this group is 
defined according to the criteria set forth in Kendra’s Law.62  In other jurisdictions 
the specific criteria will vary, but in all instances some statutorily defined group of 
people is given higher priority for mental health services than others.
Do OPC statutory definitions envelope the group most in need of the services it 
prescribes?  Would a greater public health or public safety benefit be garnered by 
changing the criteria such as to capture within the ambit of the OPC schema a dis-
tinct cohort? 
Dialogue Point 7: OPC statutes do not stand alone in the public mental health system.
Swartz and Swanson’s review of the data indicates that OPC only appears to be 
effective if combined with frequent services.63  How, then, can a discussion of OPC 
be conducted meaningfully outside of a thorough review of a jurisdiction’s public 
mental health system?  If OPC is only one point in a continuum of measures that 
society routinely applies to people with serious, chronic mental illness,64 how can the 
services that form the mandated treatment plan associated with OPC be separated 
from other public mental health services available within any given jurisdiction? 
Again, it is worth recalling that Andrew Goldstein killed Kendra Webdale after 
knocking on the doors of multiple mental health providers in New York City.65
Questions to be considered include:  How do current or proposed statutes pro-
viding for OPC fit into to the larger public mental health system?  Are adequate 
services available to effectuate well-designed treatment plans with services of suffi-
cient quality and quantity useful to the consumer?  If the answer is no, what additional 
funds, if any, would be required to change this?  Is OPC envisioned as part of a con-
tinuum of adequate public mental health services ranging from community-based, 
non-coercive services to those provided within hospitals and correctional facilities? 
Or, in contrast, is the implementation of a proposed or existing schema more fairly 
seen as a Band-Aid placed on a severely wounded public mental health system? 
Assuming that an adequate array of public mental health services is available in 
sufficient quantity to ensure reasonable access to care for those who need and/or 
want it, an important, and yet unanswered, empirical question remains: is the coer-
cive aspect of OPC orders a necessary component of the successful outcomes 
associated with these orders?  Or, are adequate, individualized services in which con-
sumers are treated with respect and afforded dignity sufficient to obtain a reasonable 
61. See Scherer, supra note 58, at 369.
62. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. L. § 9.60(c) (McKinney 1999).
63. Swartz & Swanson, supra note 10.
64. See John Monahan et al., Use of Leverage to Improve Adherence to Psychiatric Treatment in the Community, 
56 Psychiatric Services 37, 37 (2005) (“Debates on current policy emphasize only one form of 
leverage, outpatient commitment, which is much too narrow a focus.  Attempts to leverage treatment 
are ubiquitous in serving traditional public-sector patients.”).  Other forms of leverage include money, 
housing, sentence mitigation, and the threat of further incarceration, as well as outpatient orders.
65. Cooper, supra note 26.
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degree of treatment adherence?  In other words, is the coercive aspect an essential 
part of positive outcomes that may be obtained, or is it merely a politically palatable 
way to allocate needed dollars to public mental health services?  
Dialogue Point 8: The racial disparity in the application of OPC statutes is one of the 
more troubling aspects of the debate concerning the desirability of such laws.  
New York Lawyers for the Public Interest analyze the data from the New York 
OPC experience and assert that
[t]here are major racial, ethnic, and geographic disparities throughout New 
York State in the implementation of “Kendra’s Law.”  Black people are almost 
five times as likely as White people to be subjected to this law—which dra-
matically reduces freedom of choice over their treatment and their lives—and 
Hispanic people are two and a half times as likely as non-Hispanic White 
[sic] people.  People who live in New York City are more than four times as 
likely to be subjected to orders as people living in the rest of the state.  Also, 
contrary to how it has been sold, the law is used mainly on people with mul-
tiple psychiatric hospitalizations but no histories of hurting others.66
Such ﬁ ndings are serious and should not be lightly dismissed.  Th ey require an 
unﬂ inching examination of their veracity, causes, and implications, as they have social 
justice, public policy, and equal protection clause implications.  First, I would suggest 
that the issue should be made more precise: Is the assertion that, in speciﬁ c instances, 
the provisions of Kendra’s Law are applied disproportionately to people of color 
because of their membership in racial groups? Or is the suggestion that, like other 
putatively neutral laws or social policies, the statute’s negative, disparate impact on 
racial minorities is reﬂ ective of broader social inequities?  If an examination were to 
reveal the former, the issue does not warrant status as a dialogue point, but rather 
should be dealt with promptly and robustly under existing civil rights statutes.
However, if at heart, the suggestion is really the latter, we are once again con-
fronted with a legally, morally, and socially complex matter ripe for good-faith 
discussion.  Could the following findings account for the over-representation of peo-
ple of color as subjects of Kendra’s Law: (1) members of racial minorities are 
disproportionately represented in the public mental health system; (2) this system is 
inadequate to meet the demonstrated needs of public mental health patients; and (3) 
there is a disparity between the results of treatment for those involved with the pub-
lic rather than private mental health system?  What if an empirical examination were 
to find that people of color disproportionately lack the means to acquire services 
independently of OPC orders?  Could that also account for the over-representation 
of people of color as subjects of Kendra’s Law?  The basis for the aforementioned 
possible conclusions could be the result of years of institutionalized racism.  This, in 
turn, could be seen as the cause for the disparate utilization associated with Kendra’s 
Law petitions.  Is it necessary to distinguish between root and proximate causes 
66. Implementation of “Kendra’s Law”, supra note 12, at 1.
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when conducting this analysis, or is that irrelevant so long as the outcome is dispa-
rate?
At which point of this complex web does one intervene, and what would be an 
appropriate response?  What if, as the experts suggest, petitions are utilized primar-
ily for people who have multiple hospitalizations rather than histories of dangerousness, 
and, hypothetically, these multiple hospitalizations could be traced to inadequate 
access to community-based treatment in certain communities?  Where would that 
lead us?
What does the empirical evidence regarding the representation of people of color 
as subjects of OPC petitions demonstrate?  How, if at all, do these data connect with 
other indicia of inequalities in terms of access to treatment, penetration in the public 
mental health and correctional systems, and other relevant factors?  What further 
study is needed to answer these questions, and where does the data lead us in terms 
of intervention?  
IV. CONCLUSION
Paul Appelbaum notes that just because Kendra’s Law is found to be constitu-
tional “does not necessarily mean that it represents good policy.”67  This essay 
proposes some empirical questions, answers to which would assist lawmakers in New 
York (and elsewhere) in deciding whether OPC is indeed good policy.  It is my hope 
that the thoughts put forth in this essay promote some much-needed, rational dia-
logue about the wisdom of enacting OPC statutes, or once the decision to enact an 
OPC statute is made, the form it should take.  I expect, at the least, that I have sug-
gested some useful questions that must be addressed—some are philosophical, but 
others can only be answered by empirical research and legal analysis.  I hope that we 
move in the direction of thoughtful examination and reform. 
67. See Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 792.
